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S uccess in environmental tort cases frequently hinges upon highly
sophisticated scientific and other technical evidence. With con-
stant scientific innovation' in areas as diverse as bioremediation, 2
sediment chemistry,3 thermography,4 and gas chromatography,5
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1. "Science advances so quickly nowadays. We can't just count scientific
noses." Katherine Bishop, Leaps of Science Create Quandaries on Evidence, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1990, at B6 (quoting Federal District Judge John McNaught of
Boston).
2. Bioremediation is a technology of enhancing the biodegradation processes
for the cleanup of oil spills. See H. P. Pritchard, Abstract, EPA's Alaska Oil Spill
Bioremediation Project, 25 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. No. 3, at 372 (1991), available in
WESTLAW, WR-ABS Database; R.Z. Hoff, Abstract, Bioremediation: An Over-
view of Its Development and Use for Oil Spill Cleanup, 26 MARINE POLLUTION
BULL. No. 9, at 476 (1993), available in WESTLAW, WR-ABS Database.
3. "Sediment chemistry" was utilized to track the movement and biodegrada-
tion process of oil spilled into Prince William Sound by the Exxon Valdez. See
D.K. Button, Abstract, Interactions between Marine Bacteria and Dissolved-
Phase and Beached Hydrocarbons after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 58 APPLIED
AND ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY No. 1, at 243 (1992), available in WESTLAW,
WR-ABS Database.
4. Thermography is a new diagnostic technique which purports to objectively
quantify pain and injury by measuring differentials in local skin temperature. See
Andrew B. Lustigman, A New Look at Thermography's Place in the Courtroom:
A Reconciliation of the Conflicting Evidentiary Rules, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 419
(1990).
5. Gas chromatography, a technique that separates compounds according to
molecular weight, has been used to measure the exposure of marine organisms to
petroleum. See M.M. Krahn et al., Abstract, Comparison of High Performance
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new techniques of diagnosing injury as well as natural resource
damage have resulted in a myriad of scientific specialties.6 For
many years, courts have grappled with the problems surrounding
the admissibility of expert testimony derived from newly ascer-
tained or applied scientific theories.7 When judges are presented
with dense, technology-rich language of scientific evidence, they
often require the help of scientists to cull the legal issues that the
scientific evidence bears to light Since the technology is so far-re-
moved from the generalist judge's own repertoire of knowledge, he
may be more reluctant to issue speedy, pre-trial judicial action that
may significantly curtail further environmental damage.9 Further-
Liquid Chromatography/Fluorescence Screening and Gas Chromatography/Mass
Spectrometry Analysis for Aromatic Compounds in Sediments Sampled After the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1993), 26 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. No. 4, at 699 (1993),
available in WESTLAW, WR-ABS Database.
6. Steven P. McDonald & Jon K. Wactor, Practicing in the Brave New
World of Scientific Litigation Post Daubert v. Merrell Dow, RECORDER, Oct. 5,
1994, at 10.
7. One example of novel scientific evidence used to prove general causation
in In re Exxon Valdez Litigation, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska, 1991) involved
chemical fingerprinting. Exxon utilized scientific evidence gathered in a 1990
study by the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") that the oil residues in sediments
and beaches at Prince William Sound in Alaska did not have the chemical char-
acteristics of the North Slope oil that Exxon's tanker had been carrying. Keith A.
Kvenholden, the lead scientist of the study, stated that "residues from the Exxon
Valdez and asphalt spills are readily distinguishable, because the asphalt originat-
ed from California oil, which has very different characteristics." Andrew Blum, It
Touts "Fingerprints": Exxon Tries New Tack on Spill, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1993,
at 3; see also K.A. Kvenvolden, Abstract, Hydrocarbons in Oil Residues on
Beaches of Islands of Prince William Sound, Alaska, 26 MARINE POLLUTION
BULL. No. 1, at 24 (1993), available in WESTLAW, WR-ABS Database.
8. See Constance Holden, Science in Court: Expert Testimony in Damage
Suits Involving Toxic Substances, 243 SCIENCE 1658, 1659 (1989); Bishop, supra
note 1, at B6.
9. One commentator has observed that our nine hundred year old judicial
system probably never anticipated lay jurors and a single generalist judge to be
subject to scores of expert witnesses armed with new-fangled information far
ouside the scope of day-to-day experiences. Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S.
Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for
Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1875, 1879
(1994). During the first-phase of the Exxon trial, which only considered the issue
of liability, jurors listened to "18 witnesses from the defendant, Exxon, and 42
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more, the particular subject matter may cause both judges and juries
to "decide an issue by something other than the scientific force of
the testimony."1 0 In many of these types of cases, only the use of
expert testimony enables a trier of fact begin to determine whether
there is an injury, much less who is liable." The cases are docu-
ment intensive, involve a great deal of discovery, expert witnesses,
and often a huge amount of technological data with their own con-
cepts and language. 2
For example, in the civil litigation over the Exxon Valdez oil
spill of 1989, lawyers on either side amassed millions of pages of
documents, interviewed hundreds of witnesses and spent months in
technical libraries to master details about the life cycles of the dam-
aged animal and plant species. 3 Rooms of scientific data and a
cadre of scientists were used to prove that the oil spill caused a
cascade of toxic effects to the natural environment of Prince Wil-
liam Sound, and resulted in direct losses to a vast array of inhabit-
ants.'4 The plaintiffs were a diverse group of Alaska natives, com-
mercial fishermen, fish processors and distributors, area businesses,
state and local municipalities, and environmental groups. 5
The extensive use of experts and cutting-edge scientific evidence
in cases like the Exxon Valdez litigation has led tort reform advo-
cates such as Peter Huber 6 of the Manhattan Institute to criticize
from the plaintiffs side." Emily Barker, The Exxon Trial: A Do-it-yourself Jury,
AM. LAWYER, Nov. 1994, at 68.
10. McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10. One study has even suggested
that highly technical expert testimony is processed differently by the human brain
than other types of information. See Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court-
Appointed Experts, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 455 n.1 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Keith Schneider, An Exxon Verdict of $286.8 Million, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
12, 1994, at Al.
13. Id.
14. Barker, supra note 9, at 68.
15. Thomas R. Kline et al., Energy Resources Law: Environmental Con-
straints on Energy Development, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 270, 277 (1990); see Stew-
art Yerton, A Look Back at Big Suits, AMER. LAWYER, Mar. 1994, at 112.
16. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991). This book has sparked a debate among legal scholars about
the nature and extent of the abuse of science in litigation. See, e.g., Paul C.
Giannelli, Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. 105, 107 (1993);
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the structure of the modem tort system. 17 Huber attacks the laxity
of evidentiary rules which encourages a supposedly staggering vol-
ume of quack scientific testimony not much better than that used in
the Salem witch trials."8 The reason why almost every environ-
mental tort case involves the use of a large amount of scientific
evidence is that proving causal relationships is extremely diffi-
cult. 9 The difficulty is aggravated when the forces causing harm
"do not produce a signature disease," and there exists "no generally
accepted biological theory about how these substances produce their
alleged effect," and there is only a "weak correlation between the
substance or force and the injury."" Further, many claimants do
not prevail in litigation because they fail to meet the stiff "prepon-
derance" standard that our tort system requires.2' Also, in environ-
Jeff L. Lewin, Book Review, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of
Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1992); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund
Ursin, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, 254 SCIENCE 1663,
1664 (1991)(book review).
17. The issue of junk science entered into the political arena as well. Under
the direction of former Vice President Dan Quayle, the President's Council on
Competitiveness formed a Civil Justice Reform Task Force to investigate and
root out junk science excesses in the courtroom. Giannelli, supra note 16, at 109.
18. HUBER, supra note 16, at 3.
19. Valerie Mike, Understanding Uncertainties in Medical Evidence: Profes-
sional and Public Responsibilities, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND
VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 115, 118 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hol-
lander eds., 1991) [hereinafter ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE]. Proof of causation con-
sists of two parts: general causation and specific harm. General causation analyz-
es whether exposure to a substance causes harm to anyone. Specific causation
asks whether exposure to a substance caused a particular plaintiff's injury. Both
general and specific causation must be shown in order to successfully pass the
preponderance of the evidence test. Merely demonstrating that something resulted
in the plaintiff's injuries is insufficient, and the plaintiff must be able to show a
direct causal link between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injuries. Joseph
Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993).
20. Sanders, supra note 19, at 14.
21. Lewin, supra note 16, at 201 n.75. The burden of proof required to dem-
onstrate causation is one of preponderance of the evidence, and courts have gen-
erally attached the requirement that the causal link have a "degree of certainty
exceeding fifty percent." The law does not accept a causal link that has a less
than fifty percent certitude. The standard, however, is considered by most to
impose an "all or nothing burden upon the plaintiff." Joseph P. Salvo, Emerging
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mental litigation, novel and quickly developing scientific techniques
or theories oftentimes are the only evidence available.22
One of the problems that complex environmental torts poses to
generalist courts is that the judges are reluctant to impose court or-
ders or injunctions that may impede the scientific investigation
process.23 It is crucial for judges to understand the science meth-
odology that is the crux of the case before a proper legal judgment
can be made.24 However, there is no one to guide the trial judge at
the interface between science and the law.25 Apart from hindering
the trial judge's ability to take proactive measure in equity, the eso-
teric nature of expert testimony may prevent judges from effective-
ly reviewing the material during pretrial hearings, and performing a
screening function.26
Views of Probablistic Evidence and Causation in Toxic Tort Actions, 8 N.Y. ST.
B.A. ENVTL. L.J. No. 4, Dec. 1985, at 15, 18. While a determination that "thirty
percent of a given incidence of a disease can be ascribed to a particular causal
agent is no less valid than a determination that fifty-one percent of the given
incidence of the disease was caused by the same agent," the law rejects the caus-
al link in the former scenario. Id.; see Lewin, supra note 16, at 201 n.75 (citing
E. Donald-Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Com-
pensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 HOus. L. REV. 781, 786
(1988)("IT]he unreasonably demanding standard of traditional tort law virtually
compels plaintiffs' lawyers to use experts who will distort the available scientific
evidence.").
22. Much of the science relevant to environmental law are innovative and
ground-breaking and by virtue of their newness, lack a wide-based acceptance in
the scientific community at large. Its newness renders it unsuitable for validation
by judicial notice. Novel evidence embodies three components: (1) a source,
meaning the mechanism, instrument, device, or theory; (2) a conduit such as an
expert who interprets the source; and (3) the data or results made accessible
through or evaluated by the source. Steven M. Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine
and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J.
1769, 1769 (1986).
23. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Along the Litigation/Science Interface,
57 BROOK. L. REV. 381, 394 (1991)(stating that judges deciding toxic tort cases
often "worry that the limitations protective orders place on dissemination of in-
formation scientists receive through discovery may conflict with the ordinary
presumption of openness in scientific research").
24. See Bishop, supra note 1, at B6.
25. Id.
26. Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 9, at 1889 n.81.
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To guide them in deciding whether expert testimony should be
admitted, federal courts have looked to the "general acceptability"
of an opinion in the scientific field of inquiry as the key basis for
admissibility of such evidence at trial.27 This standard presented a
difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in environmental litigation, where
novel and quickly developing scientific techniques or theories are
frequently the only available evidence.28 The common-law rule,
first articulated in Frye v. United States29 was followed by a ma-
jority of federal courts, but was noticeably absent from the Federal
Rules of Evidence when the Rules were codified in 1975.30
Three years ago, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,3  the United States Supreme Court explicitly displaced the
Frye standard, declaring that "general acceptability" is no longer a
precondition to placing scientific evidence before a jury.32 Rather,
27. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. Egesdal, supra note 22, at 1769.
29. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suf-
ficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs.
Id.; McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10.
30. Lewin, supra note 16, at 186 n.18; see FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
31. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
32. Id. at 2793-2794, 2799. One commentator has written that many of the ills
of "modem liability science" in the courtroom was readily remedied by ensuring
that scientific evidence was "'generally accepted' by other scientists." HUBER,
supra note 16, at 202.
A sophisticated, modem application of Frye looks to the methods
behind a scientific report, not to its finely detailed conclusions. An
epidemiological study will easily survive Frye even if it is the very
first to report, for example, a link between Bendectin and birth de-
fects, so long as standard protocols for conducting such studies have
been observed and the data are reported with error bands, significance
tests, and similar statements of caution suitable for a refereed profes-
sional journal. What should not survive, however, is a crude imitation
of science, the unpublished hunch, the letter to the editor, the impres-
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the court stated that a "flexible" test, consistent with the "liberal
thrust" of the Federal Rules of Evidence was the more proper ap-
proach to use in assessing expert scientific testimony.3" The Court
stressed the importance of trial judges in continuing their roles as
"gate-keep[ers]" to limit jury confusion and speculation,34 yet also
recognized that its new approach, though flexible, could have the
unwanted effect of preventing the jury from "learning of authentic
insights and innovations."35 More importantly, the Court conceded
that its decision was a compromise and that it could not reconcile
the problems that arise at the interface between legal and scientific
inquiry.
36
Nowhere is the interdependent, yet fractious relationship between
science and the law more evident than in the environmental tort
litigation arena. 3' There is a growing concern in the scientific
community that environmental toxic tort cases present special prob-
lems and challenges to traditional modes of scientific inquiry.3
Large environmental disasters such as the Exxon Valdez spill pro-
vide a fertile ground of data and financial resources for innovative
research at an accelerated and intensified rate. 39 Novel science en-
sionistic "mosaic theory," in which the lawyer's science of harmoni-
ous coupling substitutes for systematic observation and analysis.
Id. at 200.
33. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Daubert provided the following general de-
scription of the trial court judge's role:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial
judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2)
will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.
Id. at 2796.
34. Id. at 2797-99.
35. Id. See also Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 9, at 1883.
36. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799.
37. Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 9, at 1877 n.20 (1994).
38. Id. at 1877-78.
39. See Timothy Egan, Lawsuits Snarl Study of Imperiled Alaskan Eagles,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1989, at C1 ("[a]s much as they lament the spill, biologists
say the chance to study the effects of oil's toxic chemicals on the food chain
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ables more plaintiffs to litigate, which in return provides incentive
for further scientific discovery.' At the same time, however, suc-
cessful litigation by both parties requires strict controls over the
disclosure of all evidence gathered by researchers, and an adherence
to discovery protocols." The result is that crucial scientific re-
search which provides valuable information about environmental
damage becomes unavailable for immediate application to short-
term and pre-litigation cleanup efforts.42
This paper analyzes the role of litigation-driven science in envi-
ronmental tort litigation. Part I introduces the modes of scientific
inquiry and discusses evidence at the interface between science and
legal practice, such as environmental litigation. Part II examines the
standards articulated in Daubert and analyzes the Supreme Court's
represents a potential scientific bonanza."); Alane Fitzgerald, Valdez Litigation
Will Shape Future Environmental Law, OFFSHORE, May 1991, at 81.
40. id.
41. See Michael Parrish, Secret Studies Put Spill Damage at $15 Billion, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al; Lisa Busch, Science under Wraps in Prince William
Sound, SCIENCE, May 10, 1991, at 772.
42. Lisa Busch, Science under Wraps in Prince William Sound, 252 SCIENCE
772, 772 (1991). Delays in receiving information needed for immediate cleanup
in the Exxon Valdez spill forced one governmental agency to proceed without it.
Id. ("While waiting for results from field tests conducted in Alaska and at other
spills, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration took a cautious ap-
proach that supported the use of bioremediation, and monitored its effectiveness
to rule out potential detrimental impacts to the marine environment.").
In many instances, research is a long-term endeavor, and litigation, though
it may be long-term demands short-term analysis, and early judgment and valua-
tion of scientific factual matter. John Cushman, Legal Ripples of Spill are Said to
Distort Big Picture of Damage, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1990, at C4 ("Because the
litigants need data on damages quickly as the cases move to trial, short-term
research is being emphasized over more complex long-term studies. Most studies
emphasize looking at a single species rather than the entire biological system, and
the work is concentrating on relatively few species, mostly those with direct com-
mercial value. This undermines attempts to reach broad conclusions about the
environmental consequences of the spill."). Policymakers and courts, in their need
for quick answers, may treat "tentative scientific judgments ... as definitive
conclusions and the qualifications intended by scientists may be lost." Sheila
Jasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Com-
petence, in, SCIENCE AND LAW: AN ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE 15, 31 (William A.
Thomas, ed., 1983).
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recognition of the conflict that exists in the legal adjudication based
on scientific proof. Part III discusses the methodology currently
used by the legal system in handling scientific evidence in environ-
mental toxic tort litigation, and critically evaluates assumptions that
it has made about the utility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.
This paper concludes by recommending a fundamental rethinking of
the role of science in the adjudication of complex environmental
cases.
I. THE USE OF SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The role of scientific studies and analysis in federal agencies has
steadily increased over the last decade. The United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency, for instance, routinely utilizes animal
data and extrapolates them to human beings for purposes of risk
assessment.43 Many federal statutes mandate federal agencies to
study the risks before initiating regulatory programs designed to
achieve a prescribed margin of safety." While risk assessment in-
formation is usually gathered for regulatory purposes, private civil
litigants will often attempt to offer quantitative risk assessment as
evidence during trial.45 The use of scientific evidence is crucial for
a party to successfully litigate an environmental tort.' For exam-
43. See Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992,
33,994, 33,999-34,401 (1986).
44. Anthony J. Thompson & Donald C. Baur, Improved Scientific Capabilities
and the Management of Environmental Risk, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1532, 1532
(May 3, 1989) (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS, 18-19 (1983)). Risk assess-
ment provisions are a part of several federal environmental statutes, including: (1)
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1994); (2) Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9604
(1994). See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1995); (3) Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6939a(b)(2) (1994); (4) Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(a)(7) (1994); (5) Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(c) (1994).
45. See Vern R. Walker, Keeping a Risk Assessment Out of Evidence, Toxics
L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (Apr. 26, 1989); W. John Moore, Judge Defends Courtroom
as Tort Forum, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 25, 1985, at 2 (reporting that "information
generated by the government ... either in litigation or as part of its record-keep-
ing activities ... is the key component in determining whether a plaintiff has a
case").
46. The Daubert decision, while it will affect the admissibility of scientific
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pie, proving causation of incurrence of response costs under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act ("CERCLA"),47 is frequently determinable only by refer-
ence to scientific opinion.' In hazardous waste cleanups under the
CERCLA, the "[e]xpert's opinion as to fate and transport of chemi-
cals in the soil and groundwater may be the sole means of inter-
preting evidence at trial, and the use of medical and toxicological
experts the principle means of attempting to bring rationality to the
issue of 'how clean is clean."'49 The Superfund cleanups usually
take place years after dumping activites have occurred, and scientif-
ic tests and analysis play an integral role in the evaluation of site
conditions."
Another significant use of scientific evidence is for natural re-
source damage assessment under section 1006(e) of the Oil Pollu-
tion Liability and Compensation Act of 1990 ("OPA").5" Under
federal law, state and federal governments have statutory power to
recover for injury to natural resources and require the defendant to
restore all damaged natural resources to their condition before the
spill, or to acquire comparable resources as a replacement for what
was ruined.52 As a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress
evidence under RCRA and CERCLA, may not apply to other kinds of environ-
mental cases. For instance, in Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (1995), the
Seventh Circuit declared that Daubert's test for admissibility of scientific expert
testimony does not apply to an agency's scientific decisions. Id. at 622. In
Marita, the Sierra Club sued the United States government, asserting that the
U.S. Forest Service failed in its responsibility under the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994), to utilize "high quality" science in prepar-
ing environmental impact statements. Id. at 621. The issue in the case was wheth-
er government decision-makers received the benefit of a complete range of scien-
tific information so that they adequately understand the consequences of uncer-
tainty. Id. See Supreme Court Decision Could Affect Evidence Allowed into Envi-
ronmental Cases, 17 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 4 101 (Apr. 23, 1993) (report-
ing that Daubert "may impinge on government standards when agencies shift
from rule-making to enforcement .... In rule-making, courts generally defer to
Environmental Protection Agency expertise when dealing with scientific ambigu-
ities").
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
48. McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 2701-2761 (1994).
52. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
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passed the OPA establishing procedures for natural resource trust-
ees to determine resource injuries, assess natural resource damages,
including the reasonable costs of assessing damages, present a
claim, recover damages and develop and implement a plan for the
restoration, rehabilitation and replacement of the natural resources
under their trusteeship.53
A. The Scientific Method
Before a proper critique of the current judicial assessment of
scientific evidence can be made, it is first necessary to articulate
the views on the character of scientific truths, and the relation of
these truths to the discipline of adjudicating legal disputes. It has
been said that the pursuit of science "stands in sharp contrast to the
windy agnosticism of the modem philosopher, litigator, or social
engineer."54 Scientists, according to one science Nobel laureate,
believe that the world is knowable, that there are simple rules
governing the behavior of matter and the evolution of the universe.
[They] affirm that there are eternal, objective, extrahistorial, so-
cially neutral, external and universal truths and that the assemblage
of these truths is ... physical science. Natural laws can be discov-
ered that are universal, invariable, inviolate, genderless and verifi-
able.55
Like Glasgow, the Supreme Court also deemed it appropriate to
distinguish the mode of scientific inquiry from that of legal
knowledge. 6 While the Daubert decision serves as a guide to
§ 9607(t) (1994); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1994). See also Carol E. Kinkins & Kevin A. Gaynor, Issues Attendant Upon
Natural Resource Damage Claims, C921 ALI-ABA 699 (Jun. 20, 1994); Thomas
C. Milch & Michael D. Daneker, Key Issues in Natural Resource Damages, C948
ALI-ABA 715 (Oct. 27, 1994).
53. The Department of Interior has successfully used a computer model,
known as the Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Ma-
rine Environments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.41(a)(1) (1995), to monetarily assess natural
resource damages during litigation. Frank L. Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Lia-
bility for Restoration is Looming, NAT'L L.J. 19 (Feb. 4, 1991) (citing Colorado
v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
54. HUBER, supra note 16, at 221 (quoting Nobelist Sheldon Glasgow, whom
Huber calls a "student of real science").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 221-28. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798-99; see supra note 88 and
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trial judges in determining the usefulness of questionable scien-
tific evidence, it fails to clarify the confusion that arises when the
legal system intermingles with ephemeral scientific evidence that
is constantly evolving. 7 This distinction assumes an inherent
difference between the discovery for truth in the courtroom, and
the search for scientific truth. In one simplified sense, legal in-
quiry is often discussed in relative terms,59 while science is often
discussed in absolutes.' The role of the judge as adjudicator
perhaps is viewed as being limited to weighing the interests of
discrete parties," while the roles of cohorts in the scientific field
may move beyond value comparisons in search of universal
truths. 6
2
As one scientist has observed, scientific truths, once uncovered
by man, prove themselves "universal," and "inviolate," but the
nature of scientific inquiry itself, is never so definite.63 The sci-
accompanying text.
57. The Court, however, did draw attention, in dicta, to the larger and more
profound dilemma of the challenges in keeping the shifting spheres of scientific
and legal inquiry intact. Daubert 113 S. Ct. at 2798-99.
58. See John I. Thornton, Uses and Abuses of Forensic Science, in SCIENCE
AND LAW: AN ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE 79, 86 (William A. Thomas, ed., 1983)
(stating that "[law and science on occasion have conflicting goals, each having
developed in response to different social and intellectual needs. The goal of law
is the just resolution of human conflict, while the goal of science traditionally has
been cast, although perhaps too smugly, as the search for 'truth.'").
59. See id. at 86-87. The court must weigh societal values, as "[tihe principles
of [the legal system] are not the product of scientific observation, but embody a
system of values." Id. at 87 (quoting Glanville Williams, PROOF OF GUILT
(1958).
60. Until the birth of quantum mechanics in the earlier part of the century,
when many so-called scientific truths were called into question and uncertainty
itself became a principle of science, the prevalent mode of scientific inquiry was
to use a discrete set of scientific principles to explain with precision the cause of
a phenomenon. Salvo, supra note 21, at 16; DAVID Z. ALBERT, QUANTUM ME-
CHANICS AND EXPERIENCE 61 (1992) (stating that the "quantum-mechanical de-
scription of the world is necessarily incomplete").
61. See Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 42, at 31.
62. Marcus, supra note 23, at 385.
63. Huber argues that scientists are not "dogmatic" about their beliefs, as a
"generous measure of doubt and self-criticism is an integral part of modern sci-
ence." HUBER, supra note 16, at 221-22.
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entific methodology of hypothesis testing, which is widely used
in research, is "based on a frequentist approach to statistical
inference."' Probability has been defined as "long-run frequen-
cy, obtained conceptually from a long series of identical experi-
ments .... ,,6 By its very nature, a process dependent on proba-
bilities cannot provide absolute, invariable answers. One difficulty
in using probabilistic evidence to prove causation arises in tests
for chemical toxicity.' For instance, "guarding against false
positives increases the likelihood of false negatives., 67 When a
chemical is thought to cause "relatively rare diseases, sample
populations are small, using a statistical rule that guards against
false positives increases the likelihood of false negatives [and]
decreases confidence in the reliability of results. 68
Science's quest for absolute truths does not make scientific
findings immutable.6 ' To the contrary, instead of being insistent
about their beliefs, scientists must "acknowledge significant ob-
jections to [their] findings, and suggest ways in which they might
be contradicted or confirmed."7 The legal system thus cannot
64. Mike, supra note 19, at 126-27.
65. Id. at 126.
66. Rachelle D. Hollander, Expert Claims and Social Decisions: Science,
Politics and Responsibility, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN
RISK MANAGEMENT 160, 167 (1991).
67. Id.
68. Id.
[G]ood science, in the sense of science that does not predict a toxic
effect when there is none, is purchased at the cost of overlooking
some toxicity. This kind of good science is also more likely to predict
no toxic effect when there is one .... [I]t also may conflict with good
regulation, which may purchase the security of preventing a greater
incidence of disease at the cost of banning or slowing the develop-
ment of harmless chemicals ....
Id.
69. HUBER, supra note 16, at 221.
70. Id. at 221-222. Huber observes that "[t]he modem scientist is a credulous
skeptic-skeptic in that he demands serious evidence and proof; credulous in that
he concedes . . . that every measurement, correlation, analysis, or theory may
contain some margin of error, which may in turn conceal important but unrecog-
nized new truth. There is thus, today, a science even to uncertainty .... Good
science systematically allows for its own error, and remains expressly open to the
plausibly unorthodox." Id. at 222.
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expect orthodoxy in a scientific study when none exists. Indefi-
niteness is inherent in science. Scientific uncertainty is unavoid-
able in the methods used to establish scientific facts and in the
facts themselves. Much of the scientific evidence gathered is
"probablistic rather than absolute and provisional rather than
final, and it can never be devoid of uncertainty or the possibility
of inaccuracy or incompleteness."'" In some instances, questions
about the "quality and interpretation of data ... cannot be re-
solved definitively on the basis of current scientific knowledge,"
and are based on incomplete evidence.72
Scholars have observed that a vast political change has oc-
curred in the industrial or post-industrial world, transforming it
from "an administrative state to a scientific state."73 They note
71. Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: An Uneasy
Divorce, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE, supra note 19, 99, at 101. Silbergeld de-
scribes two types of uncertainty that are inherent in scientific knowledge:
Systematic uncertainties are those limits on knowledge that are de-
rived from the types of knowledge being sought: in [one] case, infor-
mation about likely human health risks based on data from nonhuman
species. Specific uncertainties are those arising from limitations of
specific datasets, for instance, problems in experimental protocols,
limits of statistical power, and the failure to control important
covariates ... placing a high value on prevention implies a willing-
ness to tolerate considerable uncertainty. In contrast, placing higher
value on repairing damage than on preventing it-as in traditional tort
law that works after the fact of injury,-the amount of allowable
uncertainty (in causation) is usually quite small. As stated by Judge
Jack Weinstein in the Agent Orange case regarding the health effects
associated with the exposure of soldiers in Vietnam to dioxin:
The difference between avoidance of risk through regulation and
compensation for injuries after the fact is a fundamental one. In
the former, risk assessments may lead to control of a toxic sub-
stance even though the probability of harm to any individual is
small and the studies necessary to assume the risk are incom-
plete; society as a whole is willing to pay the price as a matter
of policy. In the latter, a far higher probability (greater than
50%) is required since the law believes it unfair 'to require an
individual to pay for another's tragedy unless it is shown that it
is more likely than not that he caused it.
Id.; see also Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 42, at 24.
72. Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 42, at 24.
73. Rachelle D. Hollander, Expert Claims and Social Decisions: Science,
1996] UTILIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 497
three roles that science plays in this new political world: first,
science serves as a "product," and is promoted and controlled in
the service of innovation; second, science is used as "evidence"
where "information and the interpretation of the results of scien-
tific research [is used] in policymaking;" finally, science provides
the "scientific method," serving as the protocols and techniques
involved in "analytical, experimental, and empirical" research.74
This multi-faceted utility of scientific knowledge complicates the
task of examining the relationship between scientific knowledge
and legal adjudication.
Science that "exists at the confluence of law and science" is
generally called "forensic science., 75 This area of scientific spe-
cialization studies and practices the application of natural and
physical sciences for the just resolution of social and legal is-
sues. 6 Thus, any scientific inquiry conducted in relation to a
legal proceeding falls under the rubric of "forensic science.,7 7 It
is questionable whether a distinction should be made between
scientific evidence gathered independently of litigation, and that
gathered necessarily as a result of ensuing litigation. For example,
much of the research conducted in the wake of the Exxon Valdez
litigation was initiated and paid for by litigating parties, 78 and is,
therefore, forensic. This has raised the argument that the quality
and reliability of scientific research is negatively impacted by
research "driven largely by legal considerations rather than scien-
tific ones."79 Thus far, the Supreme Court has not articulated a
Politics, and Responsibility, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE, supra note 19, 160, at
163 (citing Juren Schmandt & James E. Katz, The Scientific State: A Theory with
Hypotheses, 11 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 40-52 (1986)).
74. Id.
75. See John I. Thornton, supra note 58, at 79-81. While forensic science has
traditionaly been closely associated with the criminal justice system, the use of
forensic science, usually adaptations of existing disciplines, is increasing in the
civil litigation and regulatory context. Id. Thorton states that a distinguishing
factor between a forensic scientist and other scientists is the "expectation of rou-
tine appearances in a court of law." Id.
76. Id. at 79-80.
77. Id. at 79.
78. See Cushman, supra note 42, at C4.
79. Id.. There is, however, support for the opinion that forensic scientists
play a valuable role in "introduc[ing] ... science into the legal process in an
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separate standard for evaluating litigation-drive science and has
uniformly applied standards for the admissibility and reliability of
scientific evidence, regardless of the impetus or reasons for the
research itself.
B. Daubert's Framework
In its effort to provide a general framework for trial judges, the
Supreme Court refrained from "set[ting] out a definitive checklist
or test"8 for assessing the reliability and relevance of expert sci-
entific testimony. The Daubert court stated that "under the Rules
the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."81 Then, to
help the trial judge in performing the role of "gatekeep[er],"82
the Court essentially set forth two guidelines for the lower courts.
First, it emphasized the multiplicity of factors that the trial court
should take into account in making its "preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodolo-
gy properly can be applied to the facts in issue."83 Second, it
explicitly reminded the trial judges of the other applicable Federal
Rules of Evidence that the trial judge can refer to for guidance.84
objective and impartial manner," and "strive to be advocates of nothing other
than their own opinions." Thornton, supra note 58, at 84.
80. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2786, 2796.
81. Id. at 2795.
82. Id. at 2798.
83. Id. at 2796. The four "general observations" that the court made are:
(1) Whether a "theory or technique" can be "tested";
(2) Whether the theory or technique has been "subjected to peer re-
view and publication";
(3) In the case of a scientific technique, the "known or potential rate
of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards control-
ling the technique's operation;" and
(4) The degree of acceptance within the "relevant scientific communi-
ty and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance
within that community."
Id. at 2796-97.
84. Daubert states that Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on other-
wise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are "of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
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The Court then remanded the case without application of its
newly announced principles. 5
The Daubert court purposely left its "scientific validity" test
vague, consistent with the views of leading legal and scientific
scholarship, that "scientists, do not assert that they know what is
immutably true," but are "committed to searching for new, tem-
porary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena., ' 6 It
recognized a distinction between scientific and legal certainty, 7
and the conflict that arises when our judicial system's require-
ment of legal sufficiency, the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard, incorrectly forces courts to measure the true value of a
scientific process.88 The Daubert decision, as does the Frye deci-
sion, continue to encourage the use of peer-review as at least one
or inferences upon the subject." Id. at 2797-98 (citing FED. R. EVID. 703). Rule
706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its
own choosing. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 706). Finally, Rule 403 permits the ex-
clusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
Id.
85. Id. at 2799; see Donald R. Frederico, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
Stirs Debate: Daubert Decision Fails to Provide Clear Guidelines, MASS. LAW-
YERS WEEKLY, Aug. 16, 1993, at S2.
86. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. The Court also quotes similar views of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, the National Academy of
Sciences, and seminal legal works on scientific evidence. Id.
87. Id. at 2798.
88. Id. The Supreme Court explicitly pointed out a distinction between the
two disciplines:
[T]here are importance differences between the quest for truth in the
courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclu-
sions are subject to perpetual revison. Law, on the other hand, must
resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced
by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses,
for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that
in itself is an advance. Conjectures . . . are of little use, however, in
the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment ...
about a particular set of events in the past.
Id. at 2798.
For a discussion of the tension between scientific and legal causation,
and the nature of scientific proof and the doctrine of legal causation, see Salvo,
supra note 21, at 18-20.
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basis to ensure the quality of scientific evidence.89 The Court's
decision, however, still keeps ambiguous when evidence must be
peer-reviewed.
The Court seems to be focusing on pre-litigation peer-review as
a basis for analyzing scientific sufficiency. However, the overall
scheme of the litigation process inhibits sharing of information
and scientific coordination among researchers of different litigat-
ing parties, until the discovery requirements take effect."° The
irony of the situation becomes clear when one considers that most
of the scientific evidence used during the Exxon litigation was
conducted and gathered after the lawsuit had already been
filed.9' The Daubert court's mode of analysis does not seem to
squarely apply to scientific research conducted during the course
of litigation. Thus, in order for the trial courts to be able to apply
the Daubert factors, the litigants will want to gather evidence that
they want to introduce in court before the court has to determine
its admissibility during in limine proceedings.
II. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Suggestions for tort reform and resolution of adjudicatory prob-
lems related to scientific evidence abound.' Many of these sug-
gestions focus on improving the level of scientific understanding
by lawyers and simplifying and elucidating the technical informa-
tion used to make legal decisions.93 Such proposals may be pro-
*89. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The de-emphasis of "general acceptability,"
in theory, however, should allow for the introduction of more cutting-edge sci-
ence and technology that is not generally known by the scientific community.
McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10.
90. Confusion and non-cooperation regarding environmental evidence occurs
not only between opposing parties, but between governmental offices, as well.
Cushman, supra note 42, at C4 ("For instance, efforts to coordinate scientific
research between the state and the Federal Government lapsed ... amid bitter
negotiations between the two over a proposed criminal plea bargain by Exxon.
Under it the company would have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars for
further research and for restoration projects. The state objected to the terms of the
Federal plea bargain, which fell apart, straining relations between Alaska and the
Justice Department.").
91. See Fitzgerald, supra note 39, at 81; Bryan Hodgson, Exxon Spill Ends Up
Tarnishing Image of Science, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1994, at B3, col. 1.
92. Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 42, at 17.
93. Id. at 27-28 (suggesting that,although a combination of technical uncer-
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cedurally, structurally, or educationally-based.94 One proposal, in
the area of product liability, suggests a "seriated trial format" in
which questions of causation are discussed and resolved before
any claims for damages are reviewed.9" Another suggestion has
been made to organize discovery in phases: a preliminary phase
to define issues, followed by discovery on the merits of the
case.' There has also been a proposal that calls for the use of a
"cadre of scientific experts who would act as aides to appellate
judges, helping them to understand problems of scientific method-
ology and to assess substantive data."'97 Yet another reform mea-
sure suggests that a system of specialty courts run by expert judg-
es be established to resolve technically-laden litigation.98
A. Public Repository of Raw Data
It has been suggested that a public repository for raw data and
subpoenaed documents gathered by adversarial and nonadversarial
researchers, and non-party governmental agencies such as the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"),
would provide ,multiple benefits.99 It would coordinate the work
tainty, a diversity of regulatory policies, and complex array of social, moral, and
religious questions are involved in the judicial resolution of problems related to
scientific and technological advances, most proposals for judicial reform focus
narrowly on increasing judges' and lawyers' technical competence).
94. Id. at 27.
95. Id.
96. See Larry Lempert, Seeds of Technology Sprout into Complex Litigation,
LEGAL TIMES, June 13, 1983, at 16. One court forced all asbestos litigation to
undergo a bench trial before it was deemed entitled to a jury trial. Id. In another
court, a simultaneous trial of liability issues in five asbestos cases was tried be-
fore different juries and presided over by the same judge. Id. Judge Thomas D.
Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio, who presided over 90 of the Cleveland
consolidated asbestos cases, "instituted several innovative and controversial pro-
cedures to speed the settlement including computer analysis of the cases, the use
of summary jury trials and limits on the time available for the taking of deposi-
tions." W. John Moore, Judge Defends Courtroom as Tort Forum, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 25, 1985, at 2.
97. See Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 42, at 27.
98. Id. at 27-28. Other reform recommendations include the appointment of
scientific advisers, special masters, or technological magistrates. Id.
99. See Hodgson, supra note 66, at B3.
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of the researchers, enable scientists to review one anothers re-
search plans in advance, and duplicate tests that produce particu-
larly interesting results."°
B. Advisory Jury
A court may also utilize its powers under Rule 706 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence to create a non-adversarial technical advi-
sory panel.' 01 The litigants may participate in the selection of
the panel members 2 and divide the advisor costs evenly among
themselves.' 3 In order to protect the confidentiality of scientific
research that has been subpoenaed, only technical advisors or
other scientists would be allowed to read the subpoenaed raw
data."°' In non-jury trials the court can appoint an "advisory
jury" that would consist entirely of experts. In the alternative, the
court can appoint "special masters" to hear motions or evidence
before the trial.0 5 Based on the special master's findings, the
judge can make more informed decisions whether or not to grant
100. See Cushman, supra note 42, at C4. (Noting that "[1]awyers for Exxon,
the state and the Federal Government have required nearly total secrecy about the
results of the research, at least until it is shared among the litigants in the pre-
trial 'discovery' process. There is no public repository for raw data, and no re-
search results or analysis are being published in scientific journals").
101. FED. R. EvID. 706.
102. A large database of technical experts are commercially available. One
such service is the Technical Advisor Service for Attorneys ("TASA"), a 35 year
old organization that provides attorneys with the names of experts in a variety of
fields. As of March 1995, TASA had a directory of 22,000 experts in fields rang-
ing from pure scientists and manufacturers to shoemakers. So far, very few judg-
es have utilized this service to locate court-appointed experts. Telephone inter-
view with Carol Stein, Director of Corporate Communications, TASA (Mar. 15,
1995).
103. Much of the cost of the environmental research stemming from the spill
was paid for by litigants, and not by the court. Cushman, supra note 42, at C4.
104. See Eliot Marshall, Court Orders Sharing of Data, SCIENCE, July 16,
1993, at 284.
105. Michael J. Saks, Accuracy v. Advocacy: Expert Testimony Before the
Bench, TECH. REV., Aug. 1987, at 42; see generally Michael D. Green, Legal
Theory: Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Liti-
gation: the Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643
(1992).
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pre-trial remedies.'" These techniques may also reduce the
number of scientific issues left for the judge or jury to cope with
at the trial."°7 A variation of the non-jury trial idea proposes the
use of technical advisors."0 8 The limited role as a technical advi-
sor to the court would avoid subjecting the court's expert to
discovery. The court could also limit the use of the adviser to
consulting on factors related to validity and relevance." 9 Pro-
posals such those outlined above may receive support from the
judicial community. A national survey of trial judges showed that
about half of the judges advocated the increased utilization of
technical advisors."10
However, the proposals described above fail to alleviate prob-
lems that cannot be remedied by simply educating the lawyers
and judges involved in litigation about the technical jargon. Sug-
gestions for increasing judicial competence in technical areas may
fall short in the long run, for "the problems faced by the courts in
dealing with controversies in these areas cannot be attributed
simply to lack of judicial expertise."' It is crucial for the judi-
ciary to recognize that complex environmental evidence, just by
virtue of its scientific nature, should not be viewed as the bane of
efficient courtroom litigation. In fact, complex, technical evidence
is quite common in many other areas of the law such as "large
antitrust cases or other litigation involving major corporate entites
and multiple parties.""' 2
Indeed, one commentator has stated that the most troubling
aspects of complex environmental cases may have "little to do
106. Green, supra note 105, at 643.
107. See Saks, supra note 105, at 42.
108. McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10.
109. Id.
110. In the survey of state and federal trial judges, 44% of federal judges fa-
vored the greater use of scientific panels to advise the judiciary on the qualifica-
tions of expert witnesses on the validity of their evidence. Louis Harris & Asso-
ciates, Inc., Judge's Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Feder-
al Trial Judges Who Spent at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69
B.U. L. REv. 731, 741 (1989).
111. Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 42, at 31.
112. Id. at 22.
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with their scientific or technical dimensions." 1 3  Rather,
"[c]ourts are confronted with voluminous records and lengthy
procedural wranglings.""' 4 An examination of the law's treat-
ment of the scientific field may elucidate what, if any, changes
must be made in the way environmental torts should be adjudi-
cated.
III. RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC
PROOF
One legal scholar has characterized the tension between scien-
tific and legal thought as a difference in classical ethos. Scientists
possess an "ethic of disinterestedness" which "serves to suppress
conflicts of personal or material interest in furtherance of a com-
mon stake in the scientific enterprise.""' Parties of a lawsuit,
however, are engaged in an ethic of "maximum self-interest"
where a "particular solution will maximize the outcome of one of
the parties only at the expense of the other.""' 6 Hence the objec-
tive of achieving "justice" is not the same as finding the truth or
the "scientifically valid result.""' 7
Since the scientific community checks the utility and quality of
scientific research, "subjecting new theories and findings to peer
review and independent verification, it is often assumed the same
standards prevail when science is applied to the fact-finding pro-
cess in a judicial trial.""' In practice, however, the self-moni-
toring processes of the scientific community become disrupt-
ed."19
Our current litigation system impedes the scientific research
process which often provides critical data necessary to stop on-
going harms in the aftermath of an environmental accident. 20
The hindrance of useful research does not necessarily arise
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Marcus, supra note 23, at 384.
116. Id. at 384.
117. Id. at 385.
118. Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness
Stand, SCI. AMER., May 1990, at 46.
119. Id.
120. Cushman, supra note 42, at C4.
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through the fault of lawyers or judges assigned to a particular
case, but through the court's imposition of traditional legal pro-
cedures that conflict with the modes of scientific inquiry. 2'
Currently, adjudicative fact-finding operates in a manner that
conflicts with proper scientific fact-finding. First, our legal sys-
tem requires all confrontations to conclude, and the litigation to
result in a fixed set of legal resolutions. 22 While "theories that
are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientif-
ic law, such as the laws of thermodynamics,"'23 attain a sense
of permanence, most scientific evidence gathered in the aftermath
of the Exxon Valdez are inchoate forms of science, requiring the
input of other researchers to challenge its hypotheses and the
underlying data that support them.'24 The scientific findings thus
transcend the boundaries of the individual research project, and
are part of a continual process of refining and purifying scientific
learning. 2 ' Second, the evidentiary process requires parties to
dissect and encapsulate these emerging scientific notions into
piecemeal testaments of scientific truths, which may be used to
121. In Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), a case involving injuries suffered
as a result of radioactive fallout from U.S. atomic testing facilities in Nevada, the
trial judge acknowledged the causation problems inherent in the current system.
He decided to "abandon traditional principles of tort causation." Salvo, supra
note 21, at 21.
122. Marcus, supra note 23, at 388 & n.24 (quoting James A. Martin, The
Proposed "Science Court,", 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977): "Nothing in the
scientific method guarantees that hypotheses will be tested or when they will be
tested, while the adversary process usually guarantees that all points of an op-
posing position will be raised and decided within the time limits of the litiga-
tion.").
123. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.ll.
124. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
125. For instance, many scientific questions that arise in making risk-benefit
assessments for setting environmental standards "cannot be answered by sci-
ence ... they transcend science." Poali F. Ricci & Lawrence S. Molton, Risk and
Benefit in Environmental Law, in SCIENCE AND LAW: AN ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE
57 (William A. Thomas ed. 1983). In the regulatory context, such as the risk
assessment of environmental impacts, "U.S. regulators place a higher value on
formal analytical methods, whose validity can be publicly tested and verified than
do regulators in most European countries." Sheila Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence
in a Pluralistic Society, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE, supra note 19, 29.
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bolster or defeat discrete points of law or fact. 26 The following
is a critique identifying the potential failure in the present judicial
system's handling of complex scientific evidence.
A. Post-crisis Judicial Management
The current tort system employs what the author calls a "morn-
ing after" or post-crisis litigation model.'27 This system assumes
that the judge's main judicial function occurs at the trial stage of
litigation, and not before. Evidence is gathered in anticipation of
presenting it at a future trial date. For example, to build evidence
in their separate lawsuits against the defendant, both federal and
state researchers in the Exxon Valdez lawsuit killed over 500
ducks, deer, seals and other animals.' In addition, government
officials stored more than 36,000 frozen bird carcasses to exhibit
during the trial." 9 While the plaintiffs amassed a wealth of evi-
dence to present at the trial stage, relatively few studies provide
information needed to obtain prospective relief.3' The trial pro-
cess implicitly assumes that the actual crisis phase is complete,
126. See Holden, supra note 8, at 1658. In Daubert, the Supreme Court identi-
fied what appears to be the closest similarity between scientific endeavors and
legal inquiry: "The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another
ephemeral ... In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant
rejection of the dross and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and
fine." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 n.13 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NA-
TURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 178, 179 (1921)).
127. Post-crisis management is common in the business arena. One business
article detailing what business organizations should disclose to the public in the
wake of a financial or public-image crisis recommended different modes of action
based on whether the "actual crisis phase [was] complete, and .. no further risk
to the health and safety of others or to the environment," continued to exist.
Jeffrey Kaufman, et al., The Myth of Full Disclosure: A Look at Organizational
Communications during Crises, Bus. HORIZONS, July 1994, at 29.
128. David Postman, More Losses in Prince William Sound: Government Kills
Wildlife for Evidence, OIL DAILY, Oct. 30, 1990, at 4.
129. Id.
130. The federal Fish & Wildlife Service announced a five-year study to deter-
mine how oil affected the eagle population. However, the study failed to deter-
mine how to rescue injured birds or do immediate tests to save the winter popula-
tion. Timothy Egan, Lawsuits Snarl Study of Imperiled Alaskan Eagles, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1989, at Cl.
1996] UTILIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 507
with no further risk to the health and safety of others or to the
environment. Such is not the case with many environmental di-
sasters. A litigation system which provides legal resolutions most-
ly for events that have already occurred is an inadequate forum
for environmental torts.' Court procedures for post-crisis judi-
cial intervention are well-developed: after determining liability,
the court thoroughly analyzes evidence for the calculation of
damages. Judicial intervention, earlier in the litigation process,
could prevent further environmental damage; however, courts are
reluctant to grant these even in environmental cases.
Judicial discretion at the pre-trial preparation level is under-
utilized.'32 As the complexity and variety of scientific evidence
and expert testimony continue to grow in environmental law, the
judges must become much more involved with a case long before
the trial begins. 33 Other than presiding over discovery motions
131. The current judicial approach to scientific evidence, where the courtroom
is a "neutral observer," is closely tied to the classical, and somewhat outdated
conception of the universe advocated by Niels Bohr, termed, "metaphysical real-
ism." Bohr presumed the universe was real "independently of human observers or
any acts of observation." MENAS KAFATOS & ROBERT NADEAU, THE CONSCIOUS
UNIVERSE: PART AND WHOLE IN MODERN PHYSICAL THEORY 3-4 (1990).
This view has been largely dispelled since the dawn of modem physical
theory in the 1940s. Modem schools of scientific thinking believe that "neutral
observation" is impossible, and that the validity of any physical theory is depen-
dent on the observer. Id. Thus, the only way that a phenomenon can be presumed
"real" is if it is subject to proof in repeatable and rigorous controlled conditions.
This modernized view is called "epistemological realism." Id.
In Daubert, the Supreme Court's encouragement of an active judicial role
in assessing the validity of the scientific proof through the four-prong test is akin
to the principle of epistemological realism. See supra note 83 and accompanying
text. Judges still need, however, to change fundamentally their perception of
themselves as neutral observers as well as neutral arbiters of the law. The judges'
duty to adjudicate the trial neutrally and fairly does not encompass a duty to
remain a neutral observer, who, waits until the scientific inquiry has been entirely
completed before assessing it. Their participation in the early stages of litigation
can have a profound impact on the quality and efficacy of the scientific evidence
gathering process.
132. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
133. The active judicial involvement that is being encouraged, however, should
not necessiate the judges' interjection of personal biases or the premature reach-
ing of conclusions prior to satisfactory evaluation of facts. These two problems
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and pre-trial hearings, the court usually does not take an active
part in the preparation for litigation. The courtroom itself will not
undertake to understand the scientific contours of a case, or arm
itself with technical advice until the need arises within an individ-
ual case.'34 The problem presented by a post-crisis adjudicative
focus is compounded in that, in many instances, evidence is not
static. While tangible evidence such as the murder weapon, or the
carcass of an otter drowned by an oil slick, may be preserved,'35
and catalogued for trial use, much of the on-going evidence gath-
ered by the numerous researchers after the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
is evolving and not constant.'36 Scientific evidence is intellectu-
al evidence, and should be treated differently.
B. Disclosure Limitations
The discovery rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow parties of litigation to request relevent information from
each other.'37 Once a party receives a request for information,
that party is legally obligated to answer truthfully and complete-
ly. "'38 Yet there is no requirement that information not requested
are commonly associated with the alternative to our own adversarial system, the
"Napoleonic" or "Continental" system, used by much of the world. Saks, supra
note 105, at 42 (the Napoleonic system "mandates that judges play a much more
active role in investigating the facts and developing a case. The judges have a
staff of their own investigators and call on their own expert witnesses.").
134. In a 1989 survey of trial judges, 76% of federal judges surveyed favored
the greater use of independent court-appointed witnesses. Symposium, Issues in
Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue, 69 B.U. L. REv. 731, 740 (1989). In
practice, however, judges generally have been reluctant to exercise their authority
under Rule 706 to appoint technical experts to assist the court in making scientif-
ic determinations, either at the pre-trial or at the trial level. Judges have cited a
variety of reasons for their reluctance to use the tools they have, including unfa-
miliarity with the subject matter, and the fear of intruding in the adversary pro-
cess. Holden, supra note 8, at 1658 (reporting on a workshop held by scientists
and lawyers on improving procedures for the use of scientific evidence in toxic
torts).
135. Postman, supra note 128, at 4.
136. Cushman, supra note 42, at C4.
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(B)(1). See Marcus, supra note 23, at 400-05.
138. Id. at 400 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) and stating that "discovery is
allowed as to any relevant matter that is not privileged").
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be provided.'39 This "loop-hole" in the disclosure requirements
has resulted in overly cautious and zealous withholding of scien-
tific research, even between parties on the same side of the liti-
gation,"4 for unclear litigation advantage purposes,"' . For in-
stance, state scientists who worked on the Exxon Valdez damage
assessment findings withheld information from the NOAA oil
spill response unit, and required time-consuming duplication of
the state's damage assessment findings. 42
This mode of discovery especially affects the resolution of
environmental tort cases. Prevention of disclosure of scientific
findings by parties preparing for litigation can severely curtail the
growth and ultimately, the utility of the research.'43 The civil
litigation over the Exxon Valdez oil spill demonstrates that, at
least in the area of environmental torts, the current judicial sys-
tem stymies efficient scientific research by preventing the open-
exchange of valuable scientific information between plaintiffs and
139. Id.
140. See Marshall, supra note 104, at 284.
141. Busch, supra note 42, at 772. Shortly after the Exxon spill, the Attorney
General of Alaska issued a series of memos to state scientists ordering them to
keep their data on the spill, especially those pertaining to the contentious issue of
environmental damage, secret. Id.
142. Id. The NOAA is a federal agency charged with providing unbiased scien-
tific information to assist spill-response organizations in handling emergencies.
Id. The state damage assessment data was not made available to NOAA response
teams until two years after the spill. After sharing the data, the state team was
forbidden by Alaska's attorney general to discuss the results at a technical advi-
sory group meeting composed of state, federal, and Exxon scientists. Id.
143. See Cushman, supra note 42, at C4. Exxon Corporation, as well as gov-
ernmental bodies such as Alaska, published very little of the data stemming from
the spill. Id. The data that was released was done in "a piecemeal [fashion] and
not in the detail needed for other scientists to review them. The only rigorous
scientific reviews [were] held behind closed doors by the agencies financing the
research." Id.; Alane Fitzgerald, Valdez Litigation Will Shape Future Environmen-
tal Law, OFFSHORE, May 1991, at 81 ("the Exxon litigation and settlements
has ... caused a deep furor among the scientific community [with] the emer-
gence of litigation-driven science, coupled with the legal sealing of scientific
evidence related to the spill.").
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defendants.' Thus, because of their adversarial ties, scientists
were hampered from truly engaging in open discussion.'45
This stifling of scientific data goes against the "hallmark of
scientific inquiry," in which "findings are shared and discussed
by the whole scientific community."'" Much of the information
gathered by government and defense-hired researchers in the
Exxon litigation could have been used in the immediate and mid-
term clean-up efforts. 47 Instead, our traditional adversarial sys-
tem compels the parties to store evidence under "lock-and-
key. 14
8
Usually, in scientific research, findings are shared and dis-
cussed by the whole scientific community. 49 But all researchers
of the Valdez oil spill were forbidden not only to share their
results, but even to say what type of research they were undertak-
ing.' It has been suggested that if scientists served in a limited
144. See Frank L. Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Liability for Restoration is
Looming, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 19.
145. Id.
146. Fitzgerald, supra note 143, at 81.
147. See supra notes 42, 138 and accompanying text.
148. Egan, supra note 130, at Cl.
Data gathered by Exxon, including information that could save birds
and animals now ... is being withheld as the company prepared to
defend itself against a host of lawsuits arising from the spill. Biolo-
gists fear that legal considerations are compromising scientific inquiry
as the focus of one of the world's largest environmental restoration
projects moves from cleanup to courtroom .... As much as they
lament the spill, biologists say the chance to study the effects of oil's
toxic chemicals on the food chain represents a potential scientific
bonanza that could be lost in legal maneuvering. The legal implica-
tions will tie up all that valuable information for a long time. The
information won't be lost, but it won't be coming out in time for us to
do anything to help the eagles. Now is the time we need it.
Id.
149. Id.
150. Almost all information about the economics studies related to the spill
were kept secret by requiring all researchers involved to sign contracts containing
non-disclosure clauses in contracts. See Michael Parrish, Secret Studies Put Spill
Damage at $15 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al. Furthermore, a technical
advisory committee composed of scientists hired by Exxon, the state of Alaska,
and federal agencies were forbidden by their respective litigation parties from
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role as technical advisers to the court, they would avoid being
subjected to discovery.'' The court could also tailor the use of
the adviser to help clarify questions related to validity and rele-
vance.
52
The premature emphasis on litigation may also harm the ability
of a potentially responsible party ("PRP") to ensure the efficiency
and accuracy of damage assessments and then to use the findings
to initiate full remedial measures.'53 In connection with the as-
sessment of natural resource damages caused by the Exxon
Valdez, the company complained about the lack of cooperation
among the various investigating agencies and the general failure
to share empirical data and expertise which would have aided in
immediate clean-up efforts.'54
C. Scientific Testimony
Compelled testimony may further disrupt the fragile relation-
ship that scientists have with the legal system. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure liberally allow discovery of all information
relevant to the proceeding, from any person, party or non-par-
ty.'55 There is no recognized exception for non-retained ex-
perts.'56 While courts in the past have been reluctant to interfere
with the lives of non-party experts by allowing compelled, but
compensated testimony, case law long before the Daubert deci-
sion established the power of the court to compel testimony from
involuntary experts.5 7
Such use of novel science in courts may result in a great intru-
sion of the judicial system into the scientific world.'58 One soci-
disclosing the results of scientific studies. See Busch, supra note 42, at 772.
151. McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10.
152. Id.
153. See Amoroso & Keenan, supra note 144, at 19; Busch, supra note 42, at
772.
154. Id.
155. McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10.
156. Id. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Evidence: Discovery Along the Liti-
gation/Science Interface, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 381 (1991), for a thorough discus-
sion of the problems of accommodating the concerns of both science and litiga-
tion in the discovery context.
157. McDonald & Wactor, supra note 6, at 10; FED. R. EVID. 706.
158. See id. (questioning whether judges and juries will be evaluating the valid-
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ologist who had been studying the Alaskan coastal villages to
measure the levels of community stress from the Exxon spill was
ordered by a federal district court to surrender his raw data.'
While this particular researcher's experience may lead one to
conclude that not recognizing a "scholar's privilege ' ' "W will
chill scientific inquiry into important environmental disasters, a
recent amendment to Rule 45 provides a limited exception for
scholars. 6' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) pro-
vides that a subpoena may be quashed if it "requires disclosure of
an unretained expert's opinion or information not describing
specific events or occcurrences in dispute and resulting from the
expert's study made not at the request of any party ....
Finally, cross-examination of an expert witness typically focus-
es on undermining the credibility or impeaching witnesses rather
than on clarifying for the jury basic discrepancies and weaknesses
in the witness' direct testimony. 6 3 For example, in the
Bendectin cases, cross examination typically involved queries
regarding the expert's fees in order to suggest that the expert is a
hired gun, rather than to critically evaluate the scientific under-
pinnings of his research."6
ity of "developing scientific inquiry" or "junk science").
159. See Marshall, supra note 104, at 284. The judge required the sociologist
to surrender raw data from a published work but allowed him to withhold infor-
mation he had collected on a confidential basis and had not cited in a published
report. Id.
160. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 381 (discussing the common law history
behind the "scholar's privilege").
161. See FED. R. CIv. PROC. 54(c)(3)(B).
162. The need requirement that the amended Rule 45 imposes is the same as
that necessary to secure work product under Rule 26(b)(3). Marcus, supra note
23, at 421 n.171.
163. See generally Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of
Expert Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875 (1994).
164. See Sanders, supra note 19, at 48; see also John S. Applegate, Witness
Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REV. 277, 311 (1989) ("While the adversarial system
touts the effectiveness of cross-examination for revealing the truth, there is little
empirical support for this conclusion.").
1996] UTILIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
CONCLUSION
The environmental tort arena is a forecast of the growing body
of legal problems that will arise as our long-standing traditions of
adjudication are continually challenged by quickly emerging tech-
nological advances. Those of us with a penchance for a precise,
technical basis for legal decisions will likely be disappointed with
the litigation process. Currently, our system heavily favors the
presentation and resolution of post-crisis evidence, rather than
immediate, and preventive measures that may benefit the public
in the long run. Some state that the traditional processes of adju-
dication are no longer capable of handling many of these
disputes. However, the problem may lie in the legal system's
insistance upon a narrow, mechanistic standard of proof that
stems from a myopic view of the modes of scientific inquiry.
This problem may be remedied by modifying the many adjudica-
tive restraints which rely heavily on limiting the flow of informa-
tion and time in order to preserve courtroom order.
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